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THE WORLD ECONOMY 
The World Economy 
The World economy i s now c l e a r l y 
m o v i n g i n t o r e c e s s i o n . 
I n d u s t r i a l o u t p u t i n t h e U n i t e d 
S t a t e s , h a v i n g r i s e n by 9.7% 
between 1 s t q u a r t e r 1978 and 1 s t 
q u a r t e r 1 9 7 9 , f e l l b a c k i n t h e 
f i r s t t h r e e months of 1980, w i t h 
p r o d u c t i o n i n March 1.5% b e l o w 
t h e l e v e l of t h e same mon th in 
1979. S i n c e f l u c t u a t i o n s in t h e 
US economy have t ended t o p r e c e d e 
t h o s e o f o t h e r d e v e l o p e d 
c o u n t r i e s i n r e c e n t y e a r s , t h i s 
d o w n t u r n i s s t r o n g l y i n d i c a t i v e 
of t h e o n s e t of r e c e s s i o n a r y 
p r e s s u r e s in t h e d e v e l o p e d wor ld 
a s a w h o l e . The London B u s i n e s s 
School f o r e c a s t t h a t wor ld o u t p u t 
i s o n l y l i k e l y t o r i s e by 0.5% 
d u r i n g 1 9 8 0 , w h i l e c o n s u m e r 
p r i c e s w i l l i n c r e a s e by a b o u t 
15%. The OECD a l s o t a k e a 
p e s s i m i s t i c v i e w . T h e i r J u l y 
f o r e c a s t s u g g e s t s t h a t g rowth in 
t h e OECD c o u n t r i e s d u r i n g 1980 
w i l l a v e r a g e 1.25% w h i l e t h e r a t e 
of i n f l a t i o n w i l l be a b o u t 12%. 
T h e m a j o r r e a s o n f o r t h e 
d i f f e r e n c e in t i m i n g of c y c l i c a l 
f l u c t u a t i o n s be tween t h e USA and 
t h e r e s t o f t h e d e v e l o p e d 
c o u n t r i e s l i e s i n t h e d i f f e r i n g 
Whi le t h e UK, J a p a n , Germany, F r ance 
and I t a l y a d o p t e d f a i r l y t i g h t m o n e t a r y p o l i c i e s o v e r t h i s p e r i o d and 
c o n s e q u e n t l y e x p e r i e n c e d a d e c l i n e i n o u t p u t g r o w t h f o l l o w e d by a s t e a d y 
r e d u c t i o n i n i n f l a t i o n , t h e US i n c o n t r a s t p u r s u e d a more a c c o m m o d a t i n g 
m o n e t a r y s t r a t e g y w i t h t h e r e s u l t t h a t GDP g r e w r a p i d l y by h i s t o r i c a l 
s t a n d a r d s , a v e r a g i n g j u s t unde r 5% pe r annum f o r t h e p e r i o d 1 9 7 5 / 1 9 7 9 . The 
o t h e r d e v e l o p e d c o u n t r i e s e n t e r e d t h e e x p a n s i o n a r y p h a s e of t h e c y c l e 
s o m e w h a t l a t e r t h a n t h e US. The r a t e of i n f l a t i o n i n t h e US a c c e l e r a t e d 
d r a m a t i c a l l y in c o n s e q u e n c e of t h e e x c e s s i v e m o n e t a r y g r o w t h , r e a c h i n g 14.7% 
i n A p r i l 1 9 8 0 . B e c a u s e of t h i s i n c r e a s e i n i n f l a t i o n t h e US a d o p t e d 
r e s t r i c t i v e p o l i c i e s b e f o r e t h e r e s t of t h e d e v e l o p e d c o u n t r i e s and i s now 
l e a d i n g them i n t o r e c e s s i o n . 
mone ta ry p o l i c i e s a d o p t e d in 1 9 7 6 / 7 7 . 
A f u r t h e r r i s e in t h e p r i c e of o i l s t emming from t h e OPEC m e e t i n g in e a r l y 
J u n e w i l l d e e p e n t h e r e c e s s i o n a r y p r e s s u r e s a s c o u n t r i e s s t r i v e t o a d j u s t 
t h e i r t r a d e d e f i c i t s . The p r i c e of a b a r r e l of o i l now r a n g e s f rom $32 
cha rged by t h e S a u d i s t o $38 f o r some of t h e h i g h e r q u a l i t y c r u d e s produced 
i n c o u n t r i e s s u c h a s A l g e r i a . B e c a u s e of a f a l l i n demand h o w e v e r , t h e 
w o r l d economy h a s b e e n a b l e t o a b s o r b t h e r e d u c t i o n s i n s u p p l y f rom I r a n . 
I n d e e d , g rowing s u r p l u s e s have begun t o pu t downward p r e s s u r e on t h e p r i c e . 
The l e a d e r s of t h e s e v e n m a j o r W e s t e r n p o w e r s , a t t h e i r s u m m i t m e e t i n g i n 
V e n i c e , have a g r e e d t o p r e s s ahead w i t h p rog rams t o r e d u c e t h e i r dependence 
on o i l . How t h i s i s t o be a c h i e v e d w i t h o u t c o n s t r a i n i n g e c o n o m i c g r o w t h 
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was unclarified. Further, the plans to double the output of coal by 1990 
and encourage other forms of substitution away from oil in order to meet 
their target of a reduction in oil's share of energy demand from 53% to 40? 
are unrealistic. 
Other comraodity prices are much more sensitive to fluctuations in the demand 
from industrialised countries. After a rapid increase of 17.2% in 1979 the 
increase in 1980 is likely to be much more modest. Coupled with the oil 
price rise, the downward pressure on commodity prices will cause a 
substantial worsening of the balance of payments deficits of the non-oil 
developing countries. Their total deficit will amount to around $60 
billion in 1980. The funding of this debt poses a great problem to the 
world financial system. Commercial banks have become wary of over-
extending themselves and national aid programmes are nowhere near the scale 
required. This puts the onus on the official institutions, notably the 
IMF, to extend their lending. It seems unlikely that this will be possible 
unless the IMF is prepared to attach less stringent conditions to its loans. 
In the US, the outlook is for continued recession throughout 1980. 
Industrial production fell by 1.2% between January and March and further 
falls are to be expected. The car industry has been particularly hard hit 
and pressure for import controls is increasing. Unemployment has risen 
dramatically, from 6.4 million in January to 8.2 million in May. With 
price inflation at 14.7% and earnings having only risen by 7-4% over the 
year to 1st quarter 1980 continued depression in consumer markets is likely; 
dissaving would need to be on a substantial scale to make up the shortfall 
in real earnings. 
The Japanese economy is also beginning to slow down. After a massive 3.9% 
rise in industrial production during the month of February alone, the level 
of production fell back in March and April. The stimulus to production is 
a consequence of the weakness of the yen which in turn results from a 
balance of payments deficit on current account caused largely by the oil 
price increase. The rate of inflation has begun to accelerate, reaching 
8.4% in April. 
The West German economy also ran a considerable ($4.7billion) current 
account deficit in 1979, again heavily influenced by the increase in the 
price of oil. After a 5% growth in industrial production in 1979, output 
has been static in the first four months of 1980. Unemployment has risen 
sharply, from 780,000 in February to 862,000 in June. This may pose some 
particular problems during this recession because the normal German response 
to slackness in the labour market, namely the repatriation of guest workers, 
is no longer an option. 
In France, INSEE predict a 4% to 5% drop in industrial production over the 
next six months, signalling the onset of recession. Due to increased 
competitive pressure, price inflation should fall from its present 15% to 
12% by the end of the year. The pressure of demand will be partly 
maintained by the strength of investment although unemployment is still 
likely to rise from its present level of 1.47 million. 
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' The UK 
Economy 
The UK e c o n o m y h a s e n t e r e d a 
r e c e s s i o n w h o s e d e p t h a n d 
i n t e n s i t y a r e l i k e l y t o e x c e e d 
t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s 
of t h e 197 4 - 7 5 d o w n t u r n . T h i s i s 
m o s t s t a r k l y e x e m p l i f i e d by t h e 
8% f a l l i n m a n u f a c t u r i n g o u t p u t 
i n t h e t w e l v e months t o May 1980 
and t h e r i s e i n u n e m p l o y m e n t of 
295 ,000 b e t w e e n December 1979 and 
J u n e 1 9 8 0 . The d i s t i n g u i s h i n g 
f e a t u r e of t h e c u r r e n t downturn 
i s t h a t t h e d e f l a t i o n a r y s h o c k 
r e s u l t i n g f rom t h e OPEC p r i c e 
r i s e s i s b e i n g r e i n f o r c e d by 
c o n t r a c t i o n a r y f i s c a l a n d 
m o n e t a r y p o l i c i e s , m o s t n o t a b l y 
in B r i t a i n b u t a l s o amongs t o t h e r 
m a j o r t r a d i n g n a t i o n s ( s e e t h e 
Wor ld E c o n o m y ) . The f a c t t h a t 
s u c h p o l i c i e s , w h i c h a r e t h e 
p o l a r o p p o s i t e s of K e y n e s i a n 
o t h o d o x y , and whose s h o r t r un 
e f f e c t s on ly e x a c e r b a t e e x i s t i n g 
d e f l a t i o n a r y t e n d e c i e s , a r e b e i n g 
i m p l e m e n t e d , s h o u l d n o t t r i g g e r 
an i m m e d i a t e d e n o u n c e m e n t b u t 
s h o u l d e n g e n d e r a c e r t a i n 
s c e p t i c i s m . 
Economic p o l i c y under t h e p r e s e n t 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i s n o t a b l e f o r 
i t s r e j e c t i o n of t h e T r e a s u r y ' s 
own b r a n d of K e y n e s i a n i s m . I t 
h a s b e e n r e p l a c e d by a r a d i c a l 
new d o c t r i n e w h e r e many of t h e 
t r a d i t i o n a l " t a r g e t s " a n d 
" i n s t r u m e n t s " of t h e K e y n e s i a n 
a p p r o a c h h a v e b e e n r e j e c t e d and i n some c a s e s j u x t a p o s e d . The i m m e d i a t e 
t a r g e t s a p p e a r t o be t h e g r o w t h of t h e money s u p p l y and t h e s i z e of t h e 
PSBR. Outpu t and employment , t h e t r a d i t i o n a l Keynes i an t a r g e t s , a r e s i m p l y 
b e i n g a l l o w e d t o a d j u s t t o w h a t e v e r l e v e l a c c o m o d a t e s t h e s e new a i m s . The 
o f f i c i a l e x p l a n a t i o n of t h i s a b a n d o n m e n t of t h e c o n v e n t i o n a l a p p r o a c h i s 
t h a t s h o r t - r u n r e v e r s a l of t h e r o l e s of t a r g e t s and i n s t u m e n t s i s n e c e s s a r y 
t o t h e a t t a i n m e n t of l o n g e r t e r m g o a l s . In p a r t i c u l a r i t i s a r g u e d , a 
l o n g - t e r m r e d u c t i o n in t h e r a t e of i n f l a t i o n and i n c r e a s e in p r o d u c t i o n w i l l 
on ly be p o s s i b l e f o l l o w i n g a p e r i o d of u n p l e a s a n t a d j u s t m e n t . C e n t r a l t o 
t h i s new p o l i c y s t a n c e i s a f u n d a m e n t a l c h a n g e i n t h e r o l e of p u b l i c 
s p e n d i n g in t h e economy. In Keynes i an t e r m s such s p e n d i n g p e r f o r m s a pump 
p r i m i n g r o l e i n s u p p o r t i n g d e m a n d . Under p r e s e n t p o l i c i e s s u c h p u b l i c 
e x p e n d i t u r e a s s u m e s a much more p r o - c y c l i c a l r o l e r i s i n g and f a l l i n g in s t e p 
w i t h a g g r e g a t e demand. S i n c e t h e m u l t i p l i e r mechanism r e m a i n s i n t a c t , such 
p o l i c i e s a r e l i k e l y t o e x a g g e r a t e and m a g n i f y f l u c t u a t i o n s i n a g g r e g a t e 
o u t p u t . 
This policy and its Keynesian predecessor both contain desirable elements 
and both also embody fatal flaws. The flaw in the policies pursued by the 
last government was to attempt to maintain the volume of aggregate demand by 
raising current rather than capital expenditure. The present government 
has fallen into a similar trap. Government current expenditure must be 
dependent on the current level of output which sustains it, but the same is 
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not true of capital expenditure. Yet it is the latter which is being cut. 
During 1980, the Treasury forecasts a fall of 17.5% in the volume of central 
government fixed investment, while current consumption is expected to remain 
unchanged in real terms. Such measures may lead to the attainment of the 
governments short run targets, but seem unlikely to contribute to the 
attainment of longer term goals. Indeed, by reducing the potential 
capacity of the economy, the reduction in investment is likely to contribute 
to the long-run maintainence of high levels of inflation. 
The attainment of the announced monetary targets restricts the growth of 
current price expenditure and output. The annual change in these 
quantities consists of both a volume and a price component. Over a period 
of years, their product approximates the rate of growth of the broadest 
measure of the money supply. If the rate of growth of real output (the 
volume effect) is relatively stable over time then it is possible to predict 
the rate of price inflation (the price effect) from rates of money supply 
growth with a degree of confidence. This necessary condition does not hold 
in the UK at present. The rate of inflation will exceed that of money 
supply growth if the volume of real output contracts - which is precisely 
what is taking place currently. The greater the gap between money wage 
inflation and money supply growth the greater is likely to be the immediate 
contraction in output and, with a lag, the fall in employment and rise in 
unemployment. None of this the government denies. The long term success 
of the chosen strategy is crucially dependent on the link between wage 
increases and employment levels being grasped and acted upon. To date 
there is only isolated evidence that this process is taking place and this 
comes mainly from the private sector. There is not yet any indication of 
how successful the government will be in curbing wage increases in the 
public sector in the next wage round. 
Meanwhile the consensus amongst forecasters is that the fall in GDP is 
likely to be of the order of 2.5% during 1980 with a somewhat smaller 
contraction in 1981. On the demand side, government expenditure and gross 
domestic fixed capital formation are declining. Under the latter heading 
the fall in manufacturing investment is put at 8% - 12% in volume by the DOI 
Investment Intentions Survey. This prediction reflects the poor 
profitability of the non-oil sector, its competitiveness eroded by the 
appreciation of sterling and accelerating wage inflation, depressed demand 
expections, and the cost of finance. Recent Treasury estimates suggest 
that the decline in the competitive position of British manufacturing 
industry in the last year has been a staggering 30%. 
The process of destocking now underway suggests a further depressing effect 
on the volume of activity. The liquidation of inventories is encouraged by 
the interest costs of financing them, and by the falling volume of demand, 
manifested in the early months of this year when the stock to output ratio 
actually rose in spite of significant destocking. 
The level of registered unemployment is rising strongly in response to the 
contraction and all forecasters expect it to rise above 2,000,000 during the 
present recession, differing only on the length of time likely to elapse 
before this occurs. At present the main contraction in employment is 
occurring in the manufacturing sector. As the recession deepens this 
pattern is likely to be replicated in other sectors. At the same time 
demographic factors are contributing to a sustained growth in labour supply. 
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The government's chosen strategy may succeed in its aim of reducing 
inflation but the structure of the British labour market is such that the 
associated levels of unemployment and volumes of output foregone are likely 
to be large. Furthermore there remains the very real possibility that the 
end result will be a situation of underemployment equilibrium of the type 
diagnosed by Keynes in the 1930's. Yet even if the government desired to 
boost the volume of demand by additional capital expenditure, very real 
problems remain. The first concerns the funding of the additional 
expenditure within existing monetary targets. The second concerns the 
economic agents through whom increased expenditure is channelled, the 
traditional avenues of local authorities and nationalised industries are 
plainly inappropriate, having failed in the past. The government truly 
faces not one, but many dilemmas. 
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